This paper aims at uncovering the di¤erent channels through which de facto …-nancial openness a¤ects economic growth and its components. The results herein indicate that de facto measures of …nancial openness (as proxied by di¤erent types of capital in ‡ows) stimulate economic growth. In particular, the results indicate that higher levels of FDI in ‡ows stimulate GDP per worker growth and crowd-in domestic investment for developing and emerging markets. As far as developed economies, I …nd that higher levels of both FDI and Portfolio-type in ‡ows improve GDP per worker growth, but that only the latter type of capital stimulates capital accumulation with crowding-in e¤ects. The one similarity between developed and developing economies is that FDI positively a¤ects total factor productivity in both cases.
Introduction
The nexus between international …nancial openness and economic growth continues to be one of the most hotly debated issues among international economists.
1 That is, do …nancially more open economies grow faster than closed ones precisely because of their openness to global capital markets? Economic theory suggests that …nancial openness should foster economic growth; however, empirical work thus far has not found robust evidence for the existence of such a link (Kose et al., 2006) . Nevertheless, the extent of …nancial market liberalization around the world increased almost continuously until very recently, where a driving factor underlying this process was the increased possibility for investors to (internationally) diversify risk. At the same time, many economies have encouraged capital in ‡ows by reducing capital controls through the introduction of marketoriented reforms; for example through the elimination of restrictions on certain types of capital.
Theoretical Developments
In a perfect neoclassical world there are good reasons for a positive e¤ect on economic growth from the integration of capital markets. For example, as Levine (2001) shows, more …nancial openness can strengthen the domestic …nancial system, thereby leading to more domestic investment, to a more e¢ cient allocation of capital, and therefore to higher economic growth. Furthermore, theoretical arguments supporting …nancial openness revolve around (a) the bene…ts of international risk sharing for consumption smoothing; and (b) the positive impact of capital in ‡ows on capital accumulation; where these likely contributions to the well-being of an economy can be particularly large for capital in ‡ows with equity-like features like foreign direct investment (FDI). Therefore, it is important to di¤erentiate between short-term and long-term capital ‡ows; where the latter type of investment brings with it not only resources, but also technology, access to markets, and knowledge. As emphasized by Berthélemy and Démurger (2000) , Borensztein et al. (1998) , and Grossman and Helpman (1991) , FDI can smooth the spillovers of managerial and technological know-how, particularly in the form of new varieties of capital inputs; furthermore, it can improve the skills composition of the labor force as a result of "learning by doing"e¤ects, investment in formal education, and on-the-job training. In addition, the trade literature suggests that although higher levels of competition stimulated by FDI may tend to reduce the revenues of local …rms, spillover e¤ects can lower costs and encourage domestic investment. 2 Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, FDI is also not as volatile, and therefore not as troublesome as short-term ‡ows that can quickly come in and out of an economy. However, some prominent economists opposed to the free movement of capital ‡ows have put forth strong arguments against …nancial openness. This side of the debate argues that …nancial openness is not necessarily welfare enhancing in the presence of distortions such as trade barriers, weak institutions, and/or macroeconomic imbalances; or if information asymmetries a¤ect the proper working of the international …nancial markets (Bhagwati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2008; Stiglitz, 2000 Stiglitz, , 2003 . Moreover, …nancial openness might not only have an ambiguous e¤ect on the level but also on the volatility of growth rates. Therefore, this side of the debate evolves around whether (a) access to world capital markets expands investors'opportunities for portfolio diversi…ca-tion and provides the opportunity to attain better (risk-adjusted) returns, or wether (b) volatility risk, sudden stops, and quick reversals in capital ‡ows, in the context of highly open capital accounts, may represent signi…cant costs. As far as the …rst point above, there are potentially large bene…ts as well (as seen from the recipient economy) since as argued by Obstfeld (1994) , access to international capital markets gives economies the possibility to borrow in order to smooth consumption in the face of adverse shocks. Furthermore, the potential growth and welfare gains, which results from international risk sharing, can be quite large. As far as the second point, concerns associated with such "reversals" have been heightened by the …nancial crises of the 1990s and early 21 st century, and although skewed fundamentals might have played a role in the abovementioned crises, they have called attention to the intrinsic instability of …nancial markets and the risks that the "unregulated" cross-border movement of capital can bring for economies without the proper "rules of the game".
Empirical Developments
Despite a rich body of contributions, the empirical literature is inconclusive vis-à-vis the …nancial openness-growth nexus. As is stated by Prasad et al. (2003) "Theoretical models have identi…ed a number of channels through which international …nancial integration can promote economic growth in developing countries... However, there is as yet no clear and robust empirical proof that the e¤ect is quantitatively signi…cant." For example, applied work by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) , Kraay (1998) , Edison et al. (2002) , and Fratzscher and Bussiere (2004) has not found a robust long-term e¤ect of …nancial openness on growth, thereby corroborating the oft-cited study by Rodrik (1998) . On the other hand, research by Quinn (1997) , Edwards (2001) and Henry (2007) shows that …nancial openness and economic growth are positively associated. More recent research has shed more light on this issue by looking at thresholds (or third factors) such as a sound institutional framework and macroeconomic stability; however, to-date these results remained mixed at best (Arteta et al., 2001; Edison et al., 2002; Klein, 2005) .
3
The theoretical literature that focuses on FDI identi…es a number of channels through which FDI in ‡ows will be bene…cial to the target economy; yet, the empirical literature has lagged behind and has had more trouble identifying these advantages in practice. The consensus that is slowly emerging is that FDI is bene…cial when compared to other types of capital in ‡ows such as portfolio investment or syndicated bank loans, though there are economists who maintain that even this bene…cial e¤ect is limited. Nonetheless, additional research e¤orts have also been devoted to identifying other features unique to FDI such as its relative permanence and the positive externalities it generates (see Aitken and Harrison (1999) for a micro-level study, and Fernadez-Arias and Montiel (1996); Sarno and Taylor (1999) for macro-level studies).
One reason why empirical research on the …nancial openness-growth nexus is still inconclusive relates to the fact that di¤erent econometric techniques make it di¢ cult to harmonize the results; and although the bulk of research papers take cross-country growth models as the starting point, visible dissimilarities remain vis-à-vis the sample of countries, the sampling period, and the estimation techniques employed. For example, contemporaneous research has typically employed a neoclassical growth model where economists regress the growth rate of real GDP per capita on a proxy for …nancial openness, in addition to a set of control variables which stand-in for fundamental growth drivers. 4 However, the econometric models employed di¤er in three important respects: (1) with regard to the measures for the degree of …nancial openness; (2) with regard to the model speci…cation; and (3) with regard to the use of the investment rate versus the capital stock per worker. Financial openness has at times been measured by the extent to which legal (de jure) hurdles impede the free ‡ow of capital (Quinn, 1997; Rodrik, 1998; Chinn and Ito, 2005) ; however, it has also been argued that …nancial openness should be measured quantitatively (de facto) by using, for example, the sum of …nancial assets and liabilities as a proportion of GDP (see Kose et al., 2006) . Eichengreen (2001) and Edison et al. (2002) compare and contrast both approaches, and conclude that the choice of indicator is both a question of convenience and accessibility to data. The second main issue in which current research di¤ers relates to the econometric model. Some authors have argued that short-term policy variables like the budget de…cit and in ‡ation need to be included (Edison et al., 2002) , while other researchers have chosen to mimic Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) , by employing a more selective set of the determinants of long-run economic growth. In particular, the addition of the investment rate as a percentage of GDP has proved challenging; for example, Edison et al. (2002) , Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) , Klein and Olivei (1999) , and Bekaert et al. (2006) did not include it under the argument of endogeneity, although the motivation has not always been discussed in detail by most economists. Nevertheless, other economists such as Rodrik (1998) , Arteta et al. (2001) , Edwards (2001) , and Klein (2003) control for di¤erent investment rates measured at the start of the sampling period; however, as Bosworth and Collins (2003) indicate, using the investment rate severely biases any results.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned caveats, the results herein show that de facto …nancial openness (as proxied by di¤erent types of capital ‡ows) stimulate economic growth for developing and emerging markets. In particular, I …nd that FDI positively a¤ects GDP per worker growth, and that FDI also a¤ects the growth rate of the capital stock per worker positively with (non-robust) evidence of crowding-in e¤ects; this mirrors the Borensztein et al. (1998) results. As far as developed economies, I …nd that higher levels of both FDI and portfolio-type in ‡ows improve GDP per worker growth, but that only the latter type of capital stimulates capital accumulation with crowding-in e¤ects. The one similarity between developed and developing economies is that FDI positively a¤ects total factor productivity in both cases.
The road map for the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the data and the econometric methodology. Section 3 explores the stylized facts of the relationship between …nancial openness and the components of economic growth. Section 4 formally looks at the relationship between de facto measures of …nancial openness as proxied by FDI and portfolio in ‡ows, to gauge the e¤ects of …nancial openness on GDP per worker growth and on the growth rate of the capital stock for both developed and developing economies. Section 5 discusses absorptive capacity and "relative backwardness" issues, while section 6 looks at the e¤ects of de facto …nancial openness on total factor productivity (TFP). Last but not least, section 7 summarizes and concludes.
Data & Econometric Methodology
Situations in which past decisions impact on current behavior are ubiquitous in economics. In this light, panel data sets provide a solution to accommodating the joint occurrence of dynamics and "unobserved" heterogeneity in the task at hand. Therefore, in order to test the hypothesis that …nancial openness and di¤erent types of capital ‡ows have a positive e¤ect on economic growth, I employ a dynamic panel-data methodology; thereby making it possible to control for country-speci…c e¤ects, the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables, in addition to autocorrelation and persistence. Nickell (1981) was the …rst to show that the least square dummy variable (LSDV) estimator is not consistent for a …nite number of time periods in panel data models; however, ever since his seminal work, a number of consistent IV and GMM estimators have been proposed as an alternative to LSDV. For example, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggest two simple IV estimators that use the second lags of the dependent variable as an instrument for the lagged and di¤erenced dependent variable. Additionally, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a GMM estimator for a model in …rst di¤erences, which is more e¢ cient than the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator. As a follow-up, Blundell and Bond (1998) detect that …rst-di¤erenced IV or GMM estimators may well experience a small sample bias due to frail instruments, especially when the data is exceedingly persistent. As a solution they suggest a system GMM estimator with …rst-di¤erenced instruments for the levels-equation and instruments in levels for the equation in …rst-di¤erences However, a weakness of both the IV and GMM estimators is that their properties hold for a large number of observations, which implies that they can be severely biased and imprecise in macro panel models. On the other hand, Monte Carlo studies by Arellano and Bond (1991) , Kiviet (1995) , and Judson and Owen (1999) show that IV and GMM estimators have a higher variance when compared to LSDV, although the latter estimator is still inconsistent. An alternative approach, based on a bias-correction of LSDV, has recently regained popularity in the literature. Nickell (1981) derives an expression for the inconsistency in LSDV, while Kiviet (1995) uses "more complicated" techniques to derive the small sample bias of the LSDV estimator. However, the approximation terms evaluated at the unobserved true parameter values are of no direct use for estimation; therefore, to make them operational Kiviet (1995) and Kiviet (1999) suggest replacing the true parameters by the estimates from some consistent estimators. His Monte Carlo evidence shows that the bias-corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC) tends to outperform the IV-GMM estimators, especially in terms of bias and root mean squared error (Bruno, 2005) . In addition, Judson and Owen (1999) give strong support to LSDVC, especially when the number of observations is small. Bun and Kiviet (2003) simplify Kiviet (1999) ; furthermore, they perform Monte Carlo experiments that show that 90% of the actual bias can be accounted for when they evaluate their …rst-order approximation term at its true parameter value. However, none of the aforementioned corrections to the LSDV estimator is possible for unbalanced panels; however, this hole in the econometric literature is …lled by Bruno (2005) . Therefore, I will employ the bias corrected LSDV estimator for unbalanced panels as developed by Bruno (2005) , where the correction employed is based on the "system GMM" estimator as developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) .
Construction of Accounts
As we know from the literature, growth accounts bode well with alternative formulations of the relationship between factors of production and output. All that is required is a su¢ cient level of competition to ensure that the returns to the factors of production are proportionate to their productivity (Bosworth and Collins, 2003) . However, as Bosworth and Collins (2003) explain, consistent measures of factor income shares are seldom available for individual economies; thereby forcing economists to use …xed income-share weights. For the construction of the accounts, I assume a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form:
The capital share, , is assumed equal to one-third for the entire sample.
5 H is a measure of educational attainment stemming from the Barro-Lee dataset. 6 I report the results through a decomposition of the growth in output per worker ( 
I assume (as in the literature) that capital services grow proportionally to the capital stock, which I estimate through the perpetual inventory model,
where the depreciation rate, d, equals 0:10. The basic gross …xed capital formation data extending back to 1960 (in constant $2000) and the measure of labor input both come from the World Bank.
Investment Rate versus the Capital Stock
As noted by Bosworth and Collins (2003) , the choice between the investment rate and the growth rate of the capital stock has extremely important implications for empirical analysis. The change in the capital stock is given by
dividing both sides by K and assuming a steady-state value ( ) for the inverse of the capital-output ratio allows the rate of change of the capital stock (k) to be measured by the investment rate:
A production function such as (2) can be re-written to replace k with the steady-state approximation (5), yielding the formulation used in many cross-national studies,
As Bosworth and Collins (2003) state:
"The use of the investment rate has an obvious advantage. It avoids the measurement problems introduced by the choice of an initial capital stock and an assumed rate of depreciation. However, the assumption of a constant capitaloutput ratio seems particularly unreasonable for studying the growth experiences of a highly diverse groups of countries, many of which seem very far from conditions of steady-state. It also seems unreasonable to assume the same capital-output ratio across a sample of countries at very di¤erent stages of development."
When it comes to the de…nition of …nancial openness, it has long been recognized that it is complicated to measure its extent (see Eichengreen, 2001; Edison et al., 2004) ; and although there have been many attempts at describing the extent and intensity of capital controls, the consensus is that any such measures fail to fully capture the complexity of realworld capital controls for a number of reasons. First, conventional measures of quantifying capital controls (or …nancial openness) fail to account for the intensity of capital controls, where the most prominent example of such measures include dummy variables stemming from the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Second, as Chinn-Ito (2007) state, "IMF-based variables are too aggregated to illustrate the complexity of actual capital controls". Thirdly, it is extremely di¢ cult to discriminate between de jure and de facto capital controls. In other words, capital control policies are regularly implemented without explicit policy goals to control the volume and/or type of capital ‡ows. On the other hand, the private sector often circumvents capital account restrictions, thereby eliminating any e¤ect of the capital controls (Edwards, 1999) .
This simple discussion suggests that a distinction between de jure and de facto …nancial openness is crucial to any analysis. After all, what matters for analyzing the relationship between …nancial openness and economic growth is not how integrated economies are "on paper", but how integrated they are in practice. Accordingly, I will proxy de facto …nancial openness through the amount of FDI and Portfolio in ‡ows (this data stems from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF). Other research has had the tendency to use net capital in ‡ows or the current account balance as proxies for de facto …nancial openness (see Prasad et al., 2007; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2009 ). However, this assumes that all capital is created equal and that they will all have similar e¤ects on an economy. Needless to say, this is an extreme assumption, since it is well known that long-term capital in ‡ows like FDI are more stable and more persistent (see Sarno and Taylor, 1999) , while short-term capital in ‡ows are more prone to sudden stops and quick reversals. It is this latter type of capital that can be more destabilizing to an economy by increasing downside risk (see Garita and Zhou, 2009) .
I also consider several additional control variables, including trade openness, the U.S real interest rate as a driver of capital ‡ows (de…ned as the US T-bill rate minus CPI in ‡a-tion -both from IFS), the black market premium as an index of macroeconomic distortions, an index of political rights from the Freedom House that ranges from 1 (the highest degree of freedom) to 7 (the lowest degree of freedom). Moreover, in order to estimate the relationship between …nancial openness, the di¤erent types of capital ‡ows, and economic growth, …ve-year periods are employed, which is typical in the literature, since …ve years is thought to be long enough to eliminate business-cycle e¤ects, but short enough to capture important changes that occur over time for a particular economy (see Henry, 2007) . Moreover, I decompose the sample into 25 developed economies and 186 developing and emerging economies (see Appendix A).
Stylized Facts
Before turning to the regression analysis, I begin by looking into the stylized facts of the relationship between de facto …nancial openness and economic growth for the entire sample (1970 2005) . Moreover, I also consider how this relationship might have changed over time by decomposing the full sample into two sub-periods: 1970 1985 and 1985 2005 . By now it is well recognized in the economics profession that a structural break occurred in the mid-1980's in many respects; but specially in terms of …nancial openness, since many economies around the world began to undertake capital account liberalization programs around this period. As far as the descriptive part of this section, the sample is further decomposed into those economies with a below(above)-average level of de facto openness as proxied by the amount of FDI in ‡ows.
Figures 1 and 2 display the cross-sectional mean of labor productivity and the average contributions of the three components separately for the less and more …nancially open developing economies (in terms of FDI in ‡ows) for the periods before and after 1985. As far as less …nancially open developing economies, the contribution of TFP remained relatively similar during both periods, while output growth was mostly in ‡uenced by the accumulation of physical capital. Turning to the more …nancially open developing economies we see that, in the period after 1985, these economies have enjoyed an almost doubling in the contribution of TFP to economic growth, surpassing the contribution of capital accumulation. Figures 3 and 4 perform the same exercise for developed economies. These …gures show that there was virtually no change in the contribution of any of the three components for the less …nancially open developed economies in terms of FDI. However, for the more …nancially open developed economies, we can notice a dramatic increase in TFP after 1985. The main conclusion of this crude disaggregation of the sample, is that on average more …nancially open developed and developing economies, in terms of allowing more FDI in ‡ows, have enjoyed faster productivity growth over the "most recent" period of globalization, and this suggests that there is a positive relationship between de facto …nancial openness and economic growth, especially TFP growth. The research avenue of analysis into the outcome of …nancial openness vis-à-vis economic growth, which I pursue in this section, is based on the view that capital ‡ows are not all created equal. For example, Stiglitz (2000) has argued that economies (especially developing economies) should pursue long-term capital ‡ows, while "regulating" shortterm in ‡ows. That is, capital ‡ows that are characterized by "equity-like" features are not only believed to be more stable and less prone to reversals (see Wei, 2006) , but are also believed to carry with them many indirect bene…ts of …nancial globalization, such as transfers of managerial and technological expertise, but also the reduction of …nancing constraints (see Blalock and Gertler, 2005 ). While we must realize that it is di¢ cult to state unequivocally that private capital ‡ows drive growth (since it could be that domestic growth drives capital ‡ows), the evidence does seem to point to the idea that private capital ‡ows can, at the very least, reinforce the growth process. Although economic theory and empirical investigations have much to say about where international capital ‡ows may gravitate, both theory and evidence are less precise about the impact of such ‡ows on a "local" economy. For example, once in a country, private capital ‡ows may increase domestic consumption, investment, and/or TFP, or they may principally increase a country's foreign exchange reserves. However, if ‡ows are driven merely by incentives to evade taxes or jump other legal barriers, money may ‡ow out of a country as quickly as it ‡ows in. The results in Table 1 show that the "standard" growth drivers have the expected e¤ect (time dummies will always be included in all regressions in order to isolate purely cross-country e¤ects; however, these results will not be reported). Moreover, Table 1 con…rms that FDI in ‡ows are indeed bene…cial to the growth prospects of developing and emerging markets.
8 Most of the burgeoning literature analyzing portfolio ‡ows into emerging markets suggests that portfolio equity ‡ows should have a positive and signi…cant impact on economic growth; however, the results in speci…cation 1:2 do not con…rm this positive association. Speci…cation 1:3 introduces the (ln)black market premium, where the results con…rm the expected negative e¤ect of the black market premium on the growth rate of an economy. 9 Figure 5 , which is based on speci…cation 1:4 shows that FDI in ‡ows do stimulate growth in GDP per worker, but only when the initial level of human capital is below 35% (section 5 will elaborate further on this issue). Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signi…cance levels respectively 9 While note reported here, I also interacted the LnBMP with FDI in ‡ows, but this interaction was not signi…cant. Moreover, the Political Rights index from the Freedom House was never signi…cant. 10 The total e¤ect is calculated as 1 + 2 HC, where 1 denotes the coe¢ cient of F DI and 2 the interaction coe¢ cient. For the moment dHC = dF DI = 0. As far as developed economies, Table 2 shows that both FDI and portfolio investment have a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on economic growth. These results are in line with Reisen and Soto (2001) and Durham (2004) who …nd that both capital ‡ows can have growth-promoting e¤ects. As far as the total e¤ect of FDI in ‡ows, Figure 6 (based on speci…cation 2:3) shows that FDI in ‡ows have a positive e¤ect on economic growth; however, this e¤ect is not signi…cantly positive for economies with a human capital level exceeding 55% (i.e. Austria, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the US).
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The results for portfolio in ‡ows can best be discerned by looking at Figure 7 , which is based on speci…cation 2:4. The …gure indicates that economies with a human capital level below 43%, are the ones that bene…t the most from portfolio in ‡ows vis-à-vis the growth rate of GDP per worker. For example, the marginal e¤ect is signi…cantly positive for Greece , Portugal (1970 Portugal ( -2005 and Spain (1970 Spain ( -1990 ; moreover, even though the United States has a human capital level of almost 46% (in the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] , I cannot reject the possibility that there is no e¤ect (or even a negative e¤ect) of portfolio ‡ows on the growth rate of GDP per worker. Another notable result in Table 2 , is the negative e¤ect of government spending on GDP per worker growth, which simply points in the direction of …scal discipline as a growth driver. 
Capital In ‡ows and the Capital Stock
The following section measures the e¤ect of de facto …nancial openness on the growth rate of the capital stock per worker. In particular, I distinguish between FDI in ‡ows and portfolio in ‡ows, where theory predicts that these type of capital ‡ows can simulate economic growth by augmenting capital accumulation and/or by improving total factor productivity (this section focuses on the …rst channel; see section 6 for the TFP channel). The growth impact of FDI ‡ows has attracted renewed interest in the wake of the "recent" …nancial crisis, where developed and developing economies alike are looking for "new" engines of growth. However, while the theoretical literature has pointed out that FDI may boost growth, the empirical literature shows considerable disagreement vis-à-vis the relevance of these impacts. On the one hand, …rm-level data often …nd no signi…cant productivity e¤ects of FDI (see for example Fernadez-Arias and Montiel, 1996) . On the other hand, macro-level studies tend to conclude that FDI boosts growth via higher productivity and/or physical investment (see World Bank, 2001) , while other papers argue that this requires the target economy to satisfy certain thresholds (see Borensztein et al., 1998) . More recent studies are even less successful in establishing a connection between FDI and economic growth (see Blonigen and Wang, 2004; Carkovic and Levine, 2005) . Despite these ambiguities, private capital ‡ows (with equity-like features) are generally found to have a signi…cant impact on domestic investment, with the relationship being strongest for FDI and international bank lending, and weaker for portfolio ‡ows (Bosworth and Collins, 1999) . Table 3 shows that, for developing economies, an increase in FDI in ‡ows of 10% leads to an increase in the growth rate of the capital stock per worker of 5:3% (in speci…cation 3:1) to 8:3% (in speci…cation 3:5). However, while these results show a positive correlation and crowding-in e¤ects 11 (for speci…cations 3:1 and 3:2) between FDI in ‡ows and capital accumulation, they also indicate that FDI might be crowding out domestic investment in developing economies (see speci…cations 3:3 3:5). Moreover, portfolio in ‡ows do not have a signi…cant e¤ect on capital accumulation (3:3). Adding the share of government expenditures (G=Y ) and an index of political rights does not change the estimates in (3:4). The last column (speci…cation 3:5) introduces an interaction between FDI in ‡ows and human capital; however, the interaction term is not signi…cant, while the total e¤ect of FDI in ‡ows on the growth rate of the capital stock increases to 0:83. 12 I also use the (ln)black market premium as an indicator of economic instability, since it can be interpreted as both a measure of expectations of depreciation of the "local"currency, and as a rudimentary index of distortions; therefore, it should be negatively correlated with the growth rate of the capital stock. As expected, the growth rate in the capital stock per worker falls with this premium. The usage of the real interest rate in the USA follows Calvo et al. (1996) who argue that the U.S. interest rate is a strong determinant of capital ‡ows, especially to developing economies. More recently, Rodrik and Subramanian (2008) have argued that domestic investment should be quite sensitive to the availability of resource in ‡ows; however, only when an economy is "saving-constrained" (I must mention that from the results we cannot say anything as to whether an economy is "saving-constrained" or "investment-constrained"). The results in Table 3 also shows that tighter monetary policy in the U.S. leads to a lower growth rate of the capital stock per worker for developing economies.
As far as developed economies, the results in Table 4 are markedly di¤erent in comparison to developing economies. However, one major di¤erence in the regression speci…cations is that the black market premium is not used since it is almost non-existent for developed economies; therefore, I use the political rights index from the Freedom House as a basic control variable. In all speci…cations the political rights index enters with a negative sign as expected (remember that this index ranges from 1 = Highest degree of freedom to 7 = lowest degree of freedom), indicating that more political freedoms are associated with 11 H 0 : > 1; H 1 : 1; t = ( 1) s ; t < 1:645 ! H 0 is not rejected. These results corroborate Borensztein et al. (1998) who also found a (non-robust) crowding-in e¤ect for developing economies.
12 Following footnote 8, the results of this decomposition show that for BRICplus economies, FDI in ‡ows have a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on the growth rate of the capital stock. For all other economies, FDI in ‡ows continue to stimulate positively the growth rate of the capital stock, with crowding-in e¤ects.
higher growth rates of the capital stock per worker. Moreover, the G=Y -ratio has a negative e¤ect on capital accumulation showing that …scal discipline is bene…cial for the growth rate of the capital stock per worker. Interestingly, FDI in ‡ows do not have a signi…cant e¤ect on capital accumulation. However, portfolio in ‡ows are positively and signi…cantly correlated with the growth rate of the capital stock, also indicating that portfolio in ‡ows to developed economies have a crowding-in e¤ect for domestic investment. International economists have long argued that along with international trade, the most important medium for international technology transfer is FDI. Furthermore, it is well known that multinational corporations (MNCs) are responsible for the bulk of the world's private R&D e¤orts, and in turn produce, own, and control the lion's share of the world's advanced technology. As argued by Blomstrom and Kokko (2003) , when MNCs set up a foreign a¢ liate, the a¢ liate receives some of the "technology" that comprises the parent's …rm-speci…c advantage and therefore allows the a¢ liate "to compete successfully with local …rms that (might) have better-quality knowledge of local markets, consumer preferences, and business practices". This argument indicates that there might be a geographical di¤usion of technology, but not necessarily a formal transfer of knowledge beyond the boundary of the MNC, since the establishment of a foreign a¢ liate is basically a decision to internalize the use of "core technology". However, MNC technology can still pour out to the surrounding economy, which improves human capital in the host economy, and can lead to productivity increases in domestic …rms. In many cases, forward and/or backward linkages play a major role, since MNCs provide training and technical assistance to their business networks, including workers and managers. In this manner, longer-term capital ‡ows with equity-like features, like FDI, can be a particularly valuable source of "new technology" since as argued in the introduction, this type of capital ‡ow not only introduce new ideas, but also strengthens the human capital base needed to adapt these ideas to the local market. However, as emphasized by Blomstrom and Kokko (2003) , productivity and technology spillovers are not certain outcomes of FDI. Instead, they argue that FDI and human capital interact in a complex manner, where FDI in ‡ows have the capability to create knowledge spillovers on the local workforce. At the same time, the host economies'level of "human capital determines how much FDI it can attract and whether local …rms are able to absorb the potential bene…ts. Therefore, it is likely that the relationship is non-linear and that multiple equilibria are possible" (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003) . For example, economies with "high" levels of human capital can attract large levels of "technology intensive" FDI, which contributes to the further development of local labor skills. At the same time, economies with weaker levels of human capital can experience relatively smaller in ‡ows of FDI; however, those foreign …rms that do decide to enter the market are likely to be "simple technology" users that none-the-less can have a major impact local learning and skill development. Kose et al. (2006) stress that …nancial openness only leads to "better outcomes" when certain initial conditions are met. In contrast, the estimation results herein (as illustrated in Figures 5-7 ) point to negative interaction e¤ects with human capital, implying that countries that operate before a certain human capital threshold seem to bene…t the most from de facto …nancial globalization. This "relative backwardness" between economies was …rst emphasized by Findlay (1978) , who highlighted its importance for the speed of adoption of new technologies and spillover bene…ts from MNCs. Findlay's model suggests that the greater the technological distance between the less advanced host country and the advanced home country, the greater the available opportunities to exploit in the host country and therefore, the more rapidly new technologies are adopted. In other words, the potential for positive spillovers is higher the larger the absorptive capacity gap between host and home countries, which is precisely the results found in this paper. In the next section, I probe deeper into this e¤ect by looking at how di¤erent types of de facto …nancial openness a¤ect total factor productivity (TFP).
Financial Openness and TFP
The approach that I follow in this last section ties in well with the literature identi…ed by Kose et al. (2006) , who emphasize the importance of TFP growth as the main driver of long-term growth. However, at the end of the day, if de facto …nancial openness is to have permanent e¤ects on growth, it must push up the production possibility frontier. The literature has argued that "total" foreign direct investment may bring new technology and management techniques that increase the e¢ ciency of "acquired" …rms and generate economy-wide spillovers. For example, Mishkin (2006) has argued that developing countries can import greater e¢ ciency by allowing foreign investors to take controlling stakes in domestic …nancial …rms, and thereby bring in state-of-the-art …nancial intermediation practices. Recently, Henry (2007) has even stated that "these stories are plausible but empirically unsubstantiated". Surprisingly, research on whether …nancial openness raises TFP is scarce. Recent exceptions are Edwards (2001) who concludes that the evidence is not robust; and Bon…glioli (2007) , who shows that …nancial integration has a positive direct e¤ect on productivity, albeit with the use of a dummy variable to proxy for …nancial integration. In addition, the empirical literature on the spillover e¤ects of FDI also gives mixed results. For example, some studies argue that foreign ownership has a positive e¤ect on productivity for domestic …rms and industries (see Barrell and Pain, 1997) ; while other studies …nd little or no evidence of spillover e¤ects stemming from FDI (see Aitken and Harrison, 1999) .
The results of the TFP-regressions for both developing and developed economies in Table 5 tend to support Mishkin's story. First, FDI in ‡ows do contribute to TFP growth for both types of economies (see speci…cation 5:1 and 6:1). Second, portfolio in ‡ows do not have a signi…cant e¤ect for developing economies (speci…cation 5:2), while portfolio in ‡ows do have a positive e¤ect on TFP growth for developed economies (see speci…cation 6:2).
13 Third, threshold e¤ects in terms of human capital do not improve the explanation of TFP growth. *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signi…cant levels respectively 13 In Table 5 I only report the individual e¤ect of portfolio in ‡ows for developed economies. When I include both FDI and portfolio in ‡ows, then both coe¢ cients become non-signi…cant.
14
14 For the BRICplus economies, FDI in ‡ows continue to have positive e¤ects on TFP growth (but only at the 10% signi…cance). For all other economies the results are the same, and positively signi…cant at standard levels.
Conclusions
In order to understand the total e¤ect of …nancial openness on economic growth, it is important to know the channels and the directionality through which such policies a¤ect an economy. Furthermore, it is important to take into account the possibility that …nancial openness a¤ects countries di¤erently (this is especially true for developed versus developing economies). In this light, this paper has probed deeper into the aforementioned relationship by studying separately the impact of de facto …nancial openness on economic growth and its components. By studying the direct and indirect channels of de facto …nancial openness, I …nd that FDI in ‡ows positively a¤ect GDP per worker growth and that these in ‡ows also a¤ect capital accumulation positively with (non-robust) evidence of crowdingin e¤ects, mirroring the Borensztein et al. (1998) results. When it comes to developed economies, the results show that FDI and portfolio in ‡ows both play a signi…cant and positive role in stimulating the growth rate of GDP per worker. As far as the growth rate of the capital stock per worker, the results for advanced economies show that only portfolio in ‡ows matter for capital accumulation with crowding-in e¤ects on domestic investment. The one similarity between developed and developing economies relates to the TFP regression results, which show that there is a signi…cant and positive correlation between FDI in ‡ows and TFP for both types of economies. The paper also …nds evidence in favor of the importance of "relative backwardness" for the speed of adoption of new technologies and spillover bene…ts. This suggests that the greater the technological distance between the "less advanced" host economy and the "advanced" home country, the greater the available opportunities to exploit in the host country, and therefore, the more rapidly "new technologies" are adopted. From a policy perspective, while the literature suggests that transitional risks are associated with …nancial openness, this paper shows that resisting de facto …nancial openness (especially in terms of FDI in ‡ows) over an extended period may prove counterproductive. One possible strategy is to try to mitigate the down-side risks associated with an open capital account (see Garita and Zhou, 2009) . In this light, sound domestic policies and institutions, a regulatory framework promoting a strong and e¢ cient …nancial sector, and e¤ective systems and procedures for monitoring capital ‡ows greatly improve the chances of ensuring that capital in ‡ows foster sustainable growth. Therefore, counter-intuitive as it may seem (especially given the severe economic downturn that is gripping the world economy), more and not less …nancial openness is the way forward; however, only if it is initially done by attracting long-term investment ‡ows, while keeping a close watch on short-term capital ‡ows. 
